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We examine the properties of alternative monetary policy rules in response to large aid 
surges in low-income countries characterized by incomplete capital market integration 
and currency substitution. Using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, we 
show that simple monetary rules that stabilize the path of expected future seigniorage 
for a given aid flow have attractive properties relative to a range of conventional 
alternatives, including those involving heavy reliance on bond sterilization or a 
commitment to a pure exchange rate float. These simple rules, which are shown to be 
robust across a range of fiscal responses to aid inflows, appear to be consistent with 
actual responses to recent aid surges in a range of post-stabilization countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa.  
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… even if government’s domestic borrowing requirement remains low, a 
large aid-funded fiscal deficit can destabilize domestic financial 
markets… To control the money supply in the face of a steep rise in 
liquidity arising from fiscal operations, the Central Bank had to step up 
the issuance of government securities to the domestic financial 
market… The only alternative sterilization instrument…was larger sales 
of foreign exchange, but this would have risked destabilizing the 
exchange rate (Brownbridge and Tumusiime-Mutebile 2007).  
Monetary management in the face of surging aid flows is a difficult business for African 
central bankers. Since the turn of the century, aid flows to the continent have, on 
average, increased in volume and become more volatile.1 Moreover, inflows have been 
increasingly targeted to general budget support and programme assistance rather than to 
project financing;  a larger proportion of aid therefore now passes through the 
government budget, reinforcing the link between aid and domestic credit creation. As a 
result, policymakers, particularly in countries where inflation has only recently been 
brought under control, have been increasingly preoccupied with how best to deploy the 
available instruments of monetary policy without yielding on hard-won inflation gains. 
These concerns span three main areas. The first is the perennial anxiety about ‘Dutch 
disease’ effects of aid which may draw the authorities into attempts to prevent the 
temporary (or persistent) appreciation of the real exchange rate in order to forestall 
perceived losses in competitiveness. The second is the fear of fiscal destabilization 
arising out of the risk that aid surges may induce difficult-to-reverse public spending 
commitments, thereby increasing the risk that the authorities will fall back on 
inflationary domestic deficit financing when aid inflows recede. Third, as the quotation 
from Brownbridge and Tumusiime-Mutebile (2007) at the top of the paper indicates, 
even when questions of medium-term credibility and competitiveness are not in play, 
policymakers may still believe that large aid inflows force them to steer between the 
Scylla and Charybdis of nominal (and real) exchange rate volatility on the one hand and 
high and volatile interest rates on the other, where the latter, in turn, raise concerns 
about private investment, the lending behaviour of the banking system and the quasi-
fiscal burden of increased domestic borrowing. 
This paper considers how these concerns may be managed over the short- to medium-
run. By casting the monetary problem in terms of how the volatility of aid flows 
transmits into volatility in the path of expected future seigniorage, we show that simple 
monetary rules that stabilize this path for a given aid flow have attractive properties 
relative to a range of conventional alternative strategies including those involving heavy 
reliance on bond sterilization or a commitment to a ‘pure’ exchange rate float. We 
examine two specific rules that achieve this objective, albeit in different ways. The first, 
which we refer to as a reserve buffer plus float,  directly stabilizes the path of 
seigniorage by synchronizing foreign exchange sales to the growth in liquidity 
generated by domestic spending out of aid. This entails initially accumulating aid 
inflows as official foreign exchange reserves and then sterilizing the full domestic 
currency counterpart of aid-financed non-import spending through foreign exchange 
                                                 
1   Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh (2006), Bulíř and Hamann (2005).  
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sales as it occurs.2 The defining feature of the buffer plus float is that it sets a time-
varying reserve target that corresponds to unspent component of aid, and allows the 
exchange rate to float freely once this reserve target is satisfied. The second rule, the 
exchange rate crawl, does not target liquidity growth directly but rather the authorities 
intervene in the foreign exchange market to keep the nominal exchange rate close to its 
long-run equilibrium rate of depreciation. In doing so, the authorities respond to the 
latent pressures coming through the private capital account which, in turn, reflect 
underlying changes in the demand for and supply of domestic liquidity. 
Although operationally very different, both rules imply broadly similar patterns of 
reserve accumulation and exchange rate movements in the face of an aid surge. 
Moreover, both are robust to plausible variations in the fiscal response to aid, albeit to 
different degrees. This matters, for, as Table 1 indicates, aid has rarely increased the 
fiscal deficit dollar-for-dollar, despite the conventional development rationale that aid 
should be fully spent, so as to maximize the contribution to public goods and services, 
and the current account deficit before grants should increase by the full amount of the 
aid flow, so as to maximize the resource transfer from donors (IMF 2005). In practice, 
spending out of positive aid surges has averaged about 75 cents on the dollar across 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), with pre-stabilization countries showing a much lower 
propensity to spend than post-stabilization ones,3 reflecting a greater weight attached to  
 
Table 1 
Spending and reserve accumulation responses to aid surges in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 1990-1997  1998-2004 
Mean expenditure out of positive aid inflows (%) 
All SSA countries  76  76 
High inflation /pre-stabilization  62  69 
Low inflation /post-stabilization  80  78 
   
Mean official reserve accumulation out of large aid surges (%) 
  Impact Long-run  Impact Long-run 
All SSA (excl. CFA zone)  0  1  1  4 
Post-stabilization 22  25  34  27 
Notes:   [1]  Post-stabilization countries are defined in footnote 3. 
  [2]   Large aid surges are episodes where aid increases by at least 2% of GDP and is sustained 
for at least two years. Long-run denotes reserve accumulation over the first three years 
following an aid surge as a percentage of the initial surge.  
Source:   IMF Africa Department. 
                                                 
2  Throughout this paper, we model budgetary aid as accruing in the form of dollar deposits owned by 
the central bank. Until aid dollars are sold by the central bank, an aid surge has no impact on 
seigniorage because net international reserves and net domestic credit to government change in equal 
and opposite directions. As aid is spent (increasing the fiscal deficit), the import component of 
spending continues to leave domestic liquidity unchanged because net international reserves fall by 
the import component of the rise in the fiscal deficit (while in the background, net domestic credit 
rises by the same amount). The liquidity injection associated with aid corresponds to the non-import 
component of aid-financed spending. A buffer plus float policy uses foreign exchange sales to sterilize 
this in full, leaving seigniorage unchanged. 
3   Post-stabilization countries—referred to as mature stabilizers by the IMF—are those that have 
established track records of fiscal discipline and low inflation over a sustained period of time. These 
include, for example, Tanzania and Uganda since the mid-1990s.   
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current inflation control; in these countries a larger proportion of any aid inflow will 
tend to be used to substitute for seigniorage.4 Amongst post-stabilization countries, in 
contrast, there is less intrinsic need to reduce seigniorage if inflation is already anchored 
by ongoing fiscal discipline. As such, the path of domestic financing is more likely to 
reflect other considerations. Here, the fiscal authorities may primarily be concerned to 
smooth the profile of government expenditure relative to that of aid, either for 
conventional welfare-based expenditure smoothing motives, to avoid excessive real 
exchange rate volatility, or out of a desire to manage credibility in circumstances when 
donors cannot commit to aid flows on an ongoing basis and where public expenditure is 
difficult to reverse (see Buffie et al. 2006). 
Thus, while there is a strong general presumption that a portion of any large aid surge 
should be held aside initially rather than being immediately spent, a distinction must be 
made between responses that reduce the present value of expected future seigniorage, 
which we refer to as deficit-reducing aid, and expenditure smoothing responses that 
alter the pattern of seigniorage over time. Our results suggest that while both rules 
deliver very similar outcomes where only expenditure smoothing considerations are in 
play, the two may perform rather differently when deficit-reduction considerations are 
important. In such circumstances the reserve plus buffer strategy is inefficiently tight; a 
managed float, on the other hand, with little or no sterilization of increases in the 
monetary base, better accommodates the increased demand for money associated with 
declining inflation and delivers a more attractive way of smoothing macroeconomic 
volatility. Common to both strategies, we should emphasize, is substantial reserve 
accumulation in the face of an aid surge; as indicated in the lower panel of Table 1 this 
is consistent with the observed behaviour of African central banks, particularly in post-
stabilization environments. 
We develop these arguments using a short-run stochastic simulation model calibrated to 
reflect key structural features of low-income African economies, both pre- and post-
stabilization  countries. On the demand side, the key feature of this model is a 
characterization of households’ portfolio choices and the financing options facing 
government which reflects the ‘imperfectly open’ capital account structures pervasive in 
much of Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus the private sector engages in currency substitution 
but neither it nor the public sector has direct access to world capital markets. Hence 
domestic government debt, which is the only marketable debt instrument in the 
economy, is effectively nontradable so that domestic interest rates are not tied down by 
interest parity conditions. On the supply side, given our focus on short-run management 
of aid flows, matters are kept deliberately simple. The capital stock is fixed and there is 
no investment in physical assets. Aid inflows thus have no impact on potential output in 
While the paper is entirely focussed on the management of aid flows, the close parallels 
with the management of commodity price volatility should not be overlooked. Similar 
macroeconomic management concerns preoccupy policymakers in commodity-
dependent economies, especially in natural-resource economies where fiscal linkages 
via the budget give rise to transmission channels from external price volatility to the 
domestic economy that closely resemble those operating in the presence of aid 
volatility. The basic arguments from this paper therefore carry over (see, for example, 
Adam and Goderis 2007). 
                                                 
4   Retiring privately domestic debt is one way of doing this, but we will focus on reducing the domestic 
credit requirement, i.e., reducing seigniorage relative to the no-aid counterfactual.  
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we provide some 
motivation for the formal simulation analysis by establishing the main lines of our 
argument and briefly describe the simulation model. Section 3 presents and discusses 
the simulation results and section 4 concludes. 
2  Model structure and core arguments  
The central insights from our paper derive directly from the accounting identities 
constraining public sector behaviour and the reaction functions that frame fiscal and 
monetary policy choices. To ensure consistency with our model-based results we define 
these identities and the policy rules in terms of the world (import) price, which serves as 
the numeraire in our simulation model. The first identity is the consolidated budget 
constraint 
t t t t t t a d z b p t m − = Δ − Δ + + Δ  (1) 
where d is the consolidated public sector deficit before aid, and a net budgetary aid. 
Equation (1) states that the fiscal deficit net of aid is ultimately financed through some 










 is the inflation tax, and  t x  is the rate of depreciation of the exchange 
rate); domestic borrowing ( ), tt p b Δ  and depletion of official net international reserves 
() . t z −Δ 5 Given the normalization,  t p is the aggregate consumption price in terms of the 
world price and b  denotes an indexed bond. The second identity is the balance of 
payments,  
. ttt t tt t y gp C fa z −− + Δ =− Δ (2) 
where  ttt t y gp C −−  is the current account deficit before aid, with g government 
consumption and C  private consumption, and f denotes private net foreign assets. 
Although net aid flows may in practice include flows that do not enter the fiscal 
accounts, we assume for convenience that all aid is net budgetary aid, so that the term a 
is the same across (1) and (2). 
The right-hand side of (1), which determines the government’s domestic financing 
requirement, is the province of fiscal policy. Assuming government revenue is constant, 
the key fiscal choice is how much of the temporary aid inflow to spend in the current 
period. This choice fully determines the deficit net of aid period-by-period. Monetary 
policy, in turn, may have important indirect effects on the fiscal position (for example 
via domestic debt service costs), but its fundamental domain is the composition of the 
left-hand side of (1), taking the right-hand side as given. The monetary authorities’ 
instruments are  z Δ , which is determined by foreign exchange intervention, and  b Δ , 
which is determined through open-market operations. Together these instruments 
                                                 
5   To keep the exposition simple, we have assumed that no non-grant foreign financing passes through 
the budget.  
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determine the path of   and  tt mt Δ  conditional on the private sector’s demand for money 
(discussed in detail below). Given the aid inflow and fiscal response, the path for the 
current account is determined by the monetary response to the aid inflow (via  z Δ ) and 
the private sector’s consequent choices over  and  f C Δ . 
To study the monetary and fiscal responses to aid shocks, we start from a steady state in 
which the fiscal deficit is financed by a combination of aid and the inflation tax, and the 
current account deficit is fully financed by aid. Writing (1) in terms of deviations from 
the steady state, the path of seigniorage then satisfies 
. )] ( [ ) ( t t t t t t b p a a z d d t t m Δ − − − Δ − − = − + Δ  (3) 
On receipt, any aid that is not immediately self-sterilizing through increased 
government imports creates an equal and offsetting increase in foreign exchange 
reserves and net central bank credit to the government. Ignoring self-sterilizing aid, 
then, domestic liquidity is ‘instantaneously’ unchanged by the receipt of aid  0 ( = −d dt  
and  a a z t t − = Δ  ). The subsequent macroeconomic response to aid is shaped by 
government’s spending decision  ) ( d dt −  and the monetary authority’s choices 
regarding reserve accumulation  ) ( t z Δ  and bond operations  ) ( t b Δ  given the endogenous 
response of the private sector. Our interest is in finding monetary policy rules that have 
straightforward operational features and that deliver acceptable responses of inflation, 
real exchange rates, and real interest rates for plausible aid-induced spending responses 
to large and temporary shocks to aid. 
2.1 Model  structure 
Before considering these monetary and fiscal rules we briefly describe the behavioural 
structure of the model.6 We work with a simple optimizing two-sector dependent 
economy model with currency substitution in which both domestic and foreign 
currencies delivery liquidity services. The representative private agent consumes traded 
imports and nontraded final goods and accumulates financial wealth in the form of three 
assets: domestic currency (m), foreign currency (f) and government bonds (b). There are 
no banks in the model, so that money is base money and foreign currency balances are 
held in non-interest-bearing forms. Capital mobility is imperfect: government bonds, 
which are indexed to consumer prices, are nontraded while the private agent has no 
access to foreign bonds. Nonetheless, the private agent can accumulate or decumulate 
foreign currency directly through transactions with the central bank or through the 
current account, depending on the exchange rate regime. 
Utility maximization by the representative agent generates conventional first order 
conditions determining the optimal path for consumption and financial asset demands. 
Aggregate consumption,  t C , is determined by the Euler equation  
1/ 1/
1 t ttt CR E C
ττ β
−−
+ = , 
                                                 
6   A complete statement of the model can be found in Adam et al. (2007).  
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. 
t p is the price of aggregate consumption in terms of imported goods (the numeraire in 
the simulation model), t R  is the real interest factor, also in terms of importables, β  is 
the subjective discount factor, τ  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in 
consumption and σ  the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between domestic and 
foreign currency.  t L denotes the liquidity services generated by money balances in total, 
t i  is the nominal interest rate on government securities and  11 and  tt x π ++  are the 
expected rate of depreciation of the local currency and the rate of inflation between 
periods  t and t+1, respectively. Finally,  t E  is the expectations operator and 
 and  mf kk are constants. These asset demands can be expressed more conveniently in 
relative terms as 
01 () ,
t





φφ φ + =− ⋅+⋅−
%
%  (4) 
where   and  tt mf % %  denote log deviations of domestic and foreign currency balances from 
their steady-state values. The parameters describing relative demands are  /0 i i φ σ =>  
and  /( ) 0 x ix φ σ =− > , where i  and  x are the steady-state values of the interest rate 
and the rate of exchange rate depreciation. Relative currency demand thus depends on 
the relative opportunity cost of holding domestic or foreign currency,  t i  and  1 tt t iE x + − , 
respectively. The sensitivity of relative currency demand to these opportunity costs is an 
increasing function of the elasticity of currency substitution.  
Combined with the consumption Euler equation the demand for domestic currency can 
be expressed as 
01 log ( ) log , ti t x t t t t mi i E x C ηη η + =− ⋅ +⋅− + % %  
where  t C %  is (the log deviation from steady state of) total spending by the private sector. 
The semi-elasticities of domestic currency demand with respect to the interest rate and 
currency depreciation are given by  0 )] )( 1 ( [
1 > − − + =
− i v i τ σ τ η  and 
(1 )( ) /( ) 0 x vi x η στ =− − − >, where v is the steady-state share of domestic currency in 
liquidity services. The steady-state inflation elasticity of the demand for domestic 
money is defined as  [( 1) ( ) ] ( / ) . i vi επ η τ στπ =⋅=+− −  For any positive steady-state 
inflation rate, this is a small number when the currency substitution and intertemporal  
7 
substitution elasticities are the same (στ = ). But, as noted below, most evidence 
suggests that στ >> so that empirically realistic calibrations can easily generate large 
elasticities. In particular, holding the nominal interest rate constant, an increase in 
expected depreciation  1 () tt Ex+  shifts desired portfolios in favour of foreign currency; 
but when  , τ σ >  this is accomplished partly through an absolute reduction in the real 
demand for domestic currency. 
The parameters σ and τ , therefore, play a critical role in governing the behaviour of the 
private sector and, in consequence, the effectiveness or otherwise of monetary policy 
rules. On their own, higher degrees of substitutability (σ ) tend to provoke larger 
portfolio reallocations and therefore greater pressures on the nominal exchange rate in 
response to shocks. A higher value of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (τ ), 
other things equal, tends to produce greater volatility in consumption and the current 
account and less volatility in the real interest rate. In this paper, we set  2 σ =  and 
0.50 τ =  which correspond to mid-range values from the limited empirical evidence on 
these parameters.7 Combined with initial steady-state values of  , ,  and  iv π , these 
values imply steady-state inflation elasticities of the demand for money of 0.53 for  
post-stabilization countries and 0.62 for high-inflation, pre-stabilization countries (see 
Table 2a). 
As noted, the supply side of the economy is simple. The economy produces exported 
and nontradable goods using sector-specific capital, an intermediate import (oil) and 
labour, which is intersectorally mobile. The aggregate capital stock is fixed and there is 
no investment. Tradable prices are fully flexible but we assume Calvo (1983) pricing in 
the nontraded goods market. This stickiness ensures that the output of nontraded goods 
is demand-determined in the short run so that macroeconomic adjustment can then take 
place off the production frontier, via temporary booms or recessions in the nontraded 
goods sector.  
Finally, the model is closed by defining a stochastic process for the external shocks. In 
this case we limit the sources of external volatility to stochastic shocks in the net aid 
inflow.8 The aid shock, which follows a stationary AR(1) process around a steady-state 
mean value, is scaled to an equivalent of 2 per cent of GDP and is characterized by an 
autoregressive parameter of 0.50. 
                                                 
7   There are no reliable direct estimates for the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign 
money for any African countries. Estimates for Latin America generate numbers in the range 0.75 to 
as much as 7, although the top-end estimates appear extremely large (e.g., Ramirez-Rojas 1985; 
Giovannini and Turtleboom 1994). Hence our choice of 2.0. There is a stronger degree of consensus 
concerning the value of inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (see, for example, Agenor and Montiel 
1999). Changing these parameters alters the model properties in intuitive ways but do not substantially 
alter our central insights. 
8  This simple one-shock structure is nested within a higher dimension structure in which we allow for 
the stochastic determination of commodity export prices, nontradable output (via rainfall volatility) 
and for volatility in intermediate input prices (‘oil shocks’). Given the specific focus on managing aid 
shocks we suppress these other sources of volatility in this paper.  
8 
2.2 Policy  rules 
We now return to macroeconomic policy choices. On the fiscal side, our focus is on the 
financing implications of fiscal policy, and in particular on the consequences of deficit 
reduction or delayed expenditure out of aid. We, therefore, adopt a simple structure in 
which domestic revenue takes the form of lumpsum taxes and government spending 
consists of transfers to the private sector.9 Taxes are held constant throughout so that aid 
shocks constitute the only source of revenue volatility.  
Fiscal behaviour is then governed by two decisions determining the level and timing of 
spending out of aid. First, a portion δ of aid may be devoted to deficit reduction. Hence 
for a given aid surge, an amount  () t aa δ −  is used to substitute for domestic deficit 
financing and (1 )( ) t aa δ −−  is spent. Based on the evidence from Table 1, we consider 
just two values,  0 or  0.25 δδ == . Second, given this planned spending out of aid, the 
fiscal authorities may choose to smooth the path of spending relative to that of the aid 
inflow. To track the spending carried over to future periods we introduce an ‘aid 
account’, denoted W. In steady state, all aid is spent so that the aid account has a zero 
balance. Outside of the steady state, the government spends a constant fraction (1 ) μ −  
of the balance in the aid account each period; the remaining fraction μ  is devoted to 
smoothing. Denoting  t W  the end-of-period balance in the aid account, the fiscal deficit 
in period t is given by 
[ ] 1 (1 ) (1 )( ) tt t dd aaW μδ − −=− − − + , (5) 
and the implied evolution of the aid account by  1 [(1 )( ) ] tt t Wa a W μ δ − =− − +. 
For  0 μ =  the aid account remains at zero and the profile of expenditure matches that of 
aid. The higher the value of μ  the more the path of expenditure is attenuated relative to 
aid. Assuming an autoregressive parameter of 0.50, the half-life of the aid shock in our 
model is one year, with 94 per cent of the aid being received within four years. With an 
expenditure smoothing parameter of  0.5 μ = , used in the simulations reported below, 
the half-life of aid-induced spending is double that of aid and only 81 per cent of the aid 
is spent within four years. A higher value of  0.75 μ =  would increase the half-life of 
spending to almost four years, with only 56 per cent of the shock spent by year four. 
The instruments of monetary policy are transactions in foreign exchange and in 
government securities with the private sector.10 To characterize reserve management, 
we begin with the simplest reaction function that accommodates alternative degrees of 
                                                 
9   In this paper we assume that spending takes the form of transfers to the private sector, rather than 
direct purchases of goods and services. In other versions of the model we allow for the authorities to 
alter the composition of public expenditure at the margin between tradable and nontradable 
consumption (see O’Connell et al. 2007). Earlier work using this model suggests that plausible 
changes in expenditure composition at the margin generate modest (and intuitive) differences in 
volatilities in the real exchange rate and the real interest rate. We lose relatively little, therefore, by 
excluding this additional policy choice here. 
10 With no banking system in model, there is no role for reserve requirements or deposit placement 
policies in the central bank’s toolkit.  
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commitment to a fixed rate of crawl:  ), ( 1 x x z t t − − = Δ α  for  0 1 ≥ α .To this we add a 
fixed long-run reserve target  , z  in order to preserve the stationary structure of the 
analysis; and, possibly, a time-varying reserve target that is tied to the pattern of fiscal 
spending out of aid. Reserve policy is therefore given by  
,

















α α α    (6) 
where  , 0 1 ≥ α   , 0 2 > α  }, 1 , 0 { 3 ∈ α  and  . 1 0 ≤ ≤ γ  Here x  is the steady-state rate of 
depreciation, which is tied down by the long-run inflation rate, and  z  is the steady-state 
level of reserves. 
The parameter  1 α  governs the degree of commitment to the steady-state rate of crawl. 
As  1 α →∞ the regime approaches a predetermined crawl in which  t x x =  on a 
continuous basis. Lower values of  1 α  represent looser commitments to the reference 
rate of crawl, and for  1 0 α =  the exchange rate floats: central bank intervention, if any, 
is independent of movements in the nominal exchange rate.11 In the floating case, all 
foreign exchange available to the economy is immediately priced in a competitive 
foreign exchange market and either added to private foreign currency holdings or 
absorbed through an increased current account deficit.  
We will refer to the combination of  0 1 = α  and  0 3 = α  as a pure float: this is the 
textbook case in which the monetary authority not only ignores the exchange rate but 
also keeps international reserves unchanged in the face of shocks. The final term in (6), 
however, allows the central bank to tie foreign exchange sales directly to the path of 
aid-induced government spending. A policy of  , 0 1 = α   3 1 α =  and  1 = γ  corresponds to 
what we call a buffer plus float. This approach is simple and intuitive: the central bank 
sells aid dollars in the precise amount required to finance aid-induced spending as it 
occurs, but floats with respect to all other shocks.12 In a buffer plus float, any aid that is 
not spent in the current period is retained as reserves. Of course, if  0 = = μ δ  so that aid 
is always spent immediately, there is no operational difference between a buffer plus 
float and a pure float. In the presence of deficit-reduction or expenditure-smoothing 
components, however, a buffer plus float involves a period of potentially substantial 
reserve accumulation during an aid boom. 
To complete the description of monetary policy we turn briefly to bond operations. The 
conventional role of bond operations is to offset the net impact of domestic credit 
creation or foreign exchange intervention on the monetary base. The reaction function  
                                                 
11 Equation (6) can be adapted to accommodate a real rather than a nominal exchange rate target by 
replacing the exchange rate term  ) ( x xt −  with () t ee − , where e denotes the real exchange rate. 
We do not examine this option here, although this case is examined in some detail in Adam et al. 
(2007). 
12   Note that the import component of aid-induced spending (zero in our runs) is self-sterilizing. It 
generates no increase in the monetary base because government deposits decline (and net domestic 
credit rises) as reserves decline.   
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12 3 1 () ( ) tt t t t t p bd a t zb b ββ β − Δ= −− +Δ− −    (7) 
accommodates this role, where  3 0 β >  allows for a gradual return of bond holdings to a 
long-run level.13 For  1 0, β >  bond operations offset a portion of the difference between 
the government’s domestic borrowing requirement and the steady-state inflation tax; for 
0 2 > β  they offset a portion of the impact of reserve accumulation on the monetary 
base. With  12 1, ββ ==  bond operations stabilize total reserve money growth over time, 
at a level equal to the steady-state inflation tax.14 
In the context of handling aid shocks, monetary policy discussions often centre on a 
‘burden sharing’ approach to managing the liquidity generated out of aid-induced 
spending. It is therefore useful to consider (6) and (7) together. In a buffer plus float, 
where  1 = γ  in the reserve Equation (6), the liquidity effect of aid-induced spending is 
fully offset through the sale of aid dollars. However, the same liquidity injection could 
be absorbed wholly or partially through bond sales. IMF (2005), for example, advocates 
a ‘50,50’ approach that allocates half of the task of liquidity management to forex sales 
and half to bond sales. Generalizing this to  ] 1 , [ γ γ −  and gearing bond operations to 
actual foreign exchange intervention (rather than to reserve accumulation) gives us a 
bond reaction function of the form 
12 3 1 (1 )( ) [ ( )] ( ). tt t t t t p bd d z a a b b βγ β β − Δ= − − + Δ− − − −    (8) 
With  12 1 ββ ==  and  0 γ = , bond operations have the conventional role of targeting 
money growth. In what follows we restrict ourselves to the case in which  , 0 2 = β  so 
that the role for bond sales is simply to offset a fixed portion of the domestic liquidity 
expansion produced by aid. When  1 γ = , foreign exchange sales take the full brunt of 
liquidity control, as in the pure float and buffer plus float approaches described above; 
for 0 1 γ <<  the burden is shared. In the simulations reported below we examine the 
specific case where  0.50 γ = . 
Both foreign exchange operations and bond operations are unwound over time, at rates 
determined by  2 α  and  . 3 β  Since private foreign currency holdings return to a steady-
state level over time, the long-run reserve target implies that aid is ultimately fully 
absorbed in current account deficits, regardless of the time pattern of aid-induced public 
spending and the other parameters of the monetary policy reaction functions. In the 
simulations reported below, we assume a relatively slow rate of adjustment, setting 
05 . 0 3 2 = = β α  throughout. 
                                                 
13 Ensuring that bonds held by the private sector return to their steady-state level means, in turn, that 
interest payments and the fiscal deficit are unchanged in the long run. This is required by consistency 
with the long-run inflation target. 
14 The dynamics of bond sterilization are of course not as simple as portrayed here since the path of the 
fiscal deficit, dt is itself a function of the interest burden on domestic debt. The simulation model used 
in the next section fully reflects this quasi-fiscal effect.  
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3 Results   
We now turn to the simulation results. These are generated from a calibration designed 
to represent two archetype economies (pre-stabilization  and  post-stabilization). 
Calibration parameters are reported in Table 2a and the variables tracked in the 
simulations in Table 2b. The archetype economies differ in terms of initial inflation (25 
per cent per annum in pre-stabilization countries and 10 per cent in post-stabilization 
countries) and initial domestic debt (20 per cent of GDP in pre-stabilization countries 
and 9 per cent in post-stabilization countries) but are identical in all other respects. 
In Tables 3 and 4 we first consider the performance of the three monetary policy rules 
introduced earlier (float, buffer-plus-float and crawl) when the total volume of spending 
out of aid is varied. In Table 3 spending follows aid dollar-for-dollar so that the total 
 
Table 2a 
Simulation model calibration values 
Parameter ‘Post-stabilization’  ‘Pre-stabilization’ 
Intertemporal elasticity, τ   0.50 0.50 
Currency substitution elasticity, σ   2.00 2.00 
Elasticity of production substitution, nu 0.10  0.10 
Foreign currency holdings, % of GDP (f) 0.12  0.12 
Domestic currency holdings, % of GDP (m) 0.08  0.08 
Private holdings of government securities, % of GDP (b)  0.09 0.20 
Net official reserves, % of GDP (z) 0.04  0.04 
Inflation rate, π (%)  0.10 0.25 
Government spending; % of GDP (s)   0.25  0.25 
Aid (aid shock), both % of GDP (a)   0.10 (0.02)  0.10 (0.02) 
Deficit reduction share dr (δ )  0.25 0.25 
Fiscal smoothing parameter (μ )  0.50 0.50 
   
Implied values:    
Nominal interest rate (i) 0.210  0.375 
Steady-state inflation elasticity of money demand  0.53  0.62 
 
Table 2b 
Definition and scaling of variables in simulation runs 
Variable  Definition  Scaling of IRs and standard deviations 
In  Inflation rate = π  percentage points from SS 
NER  Nominal exchange rate  " 
RER  Real exchange rate for imports  / I N EP P =   " 
RIR  Real interest rate  " 
Ca  Current account surplus including grants  percentage points of GDP from SS 
DN   Output of nontraded goods  % deviation from SS 
C Private  consumption  " 
Dz  Change in central bank international reserves  " 
Db  Change in privately-held government debt  " 
mg  Growth in nominal domestic money stock   " 
A  Aid  percentage points of GDP from SS 
S  Government discretionary spending   " 
dW  Change in aid account  "  
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Table 3 
Aid fully spent and fully absorbed 
[percentage change from baseline] 
Horizon [years] 
Variable    0  1 2 3 4 5  15  Std  dev. 
Aid inflow [%GDP] 
a 2.000  1.000  0.500  0.250 0.125 0.063  0.001   
    3(a): Post-stabilization countries 
1. Buffer + float 
In -1.131  -1.179  -1.258  -1.004 -0.723 -0.494  -0.004  2.491 
NER -2.436  -1.226  -1.056  -0.720 -0.466 -0.295  -0.002  3.071 
RER -2.372  -2.458  -2.090  -1.575 -1.107 -0.745  -0.007  4.549 
RIR -1.571  -1.296  -0.847  -0.528 -0.325 -0.199  -0.001  2.305 
ca 0.725  0.051  -0.143  -0.170  -0.144 -0.107  -0.001  0.787 
DN 0.785  0.197  -0.104  -0.184  -0.173 -0.135  -0.002  0.874 
C 2.306  1.592  1.003  0.618  0.378 0.230  0.001 3.077 
dz 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
mg -0.075  -2.118  -1.704  -1.091 -0.696 -0.406  -0.003  3.084 
 
2. Crawl 
In 1.089  0.046  -0.311  -0.369  -0.320 -0.246  -0.027  1.324 
NER 0.245  -0.139  -0.188  -0.158 -0.119 -0.088  -0.026  0.524 
RER -1.534  -1.870  -1.646  -1.261 -0.897 -0.609  -0.008  3.406 
RIR -1.371  -1.159  -0.812  -0.531 -0.336 -0.209  -0.001  2.085 
ca 0.863  0.127  -0.108  -0.154  -0.136 -0.103  -0.002  0.914 
DN 1.023  0.400  0.088  -0.036  -0.069 -0.066  -0.001  1.109 
C 2.159  1.536  1.009  0.639  0.398 0.245  0.003 2.949 
dz -3.338  2.062  2.625  2.088 1.455 0.954  1.410 5.507 
mg -1.179  -0.281  0.285  0.355 0.289 0.203  -0.002 1.809 
 
    3(b): Pre-stabilization countries 
1. Buffer + float 
In -4.475  -5.261  -1.987  -3.170 -0.782 -1.754  -0.152  8.186 
NER -5.981  -6.077  -0.951  -3.364 -0.062 -1.918  -0.234  9.575 
RER -2.410  -3.716  -2.059  -2.370 -1.019 -1.281  -0.079  5.742 
RIR -2.800  0.085  -1.587  0.359 -0.955  0.391 0.113  3.540 
ca 0.714  0.201  -0.180  -0.118 -0.207 -0.089 0.005  0.821 
DN 0.781  -0.752  -0.025  -0.713 -0.019 -0.465  -0.053  1.436 
C 2.322  1.049  1.087  0.366  0.529 0.096  -0.025 2.866 
dz 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
mg -0.820  -10.416  0.231  -5.663 1.354  -3.366  -0.500  12.999 
 
2. Crawl 
In 1.103  -0.075  -0.412  -0.458 -0.400 -0.319  -0.057  1.602 
NER 0.304  -0.311  -0.322  -0.265 -0.205 -0.157  -0.054  1.015 
RER -1.278  -1.655  -1.512  -1.203 -0.890 -0.631  -0.013  3.106 
RIR -1.170  -0.947  -0.678  -0.462 -0.309 -0.203  -0.003  1.763 
ca 1.012  0.229  -0.058  -0.138  -0.139 -0.114  -0.004  1.070 
DN 0.921  0.351  0.079  -0.029  -0.060 -0.060  -0.002  0.995 
C 1.887  1.355  0.924  0.616  0.406 0.266  0.005 2.630 
dz -3.652  3.610  3.860  2.971 2.103 1.429  2.479 7.779 
mg -2.022  -0.552  0.136  0.295 0.277 0.210  -0.047 2.281 
Notes:  [1] An increase in NER and RER denotes a depreciation in the nominal and real exchange rates 
respectively.  
  [2] See Tables 2a and 2b for parameter settings. 
  [3] For float, z1=0; for crawl, z1=15 and z2=0.95. 
 [4]  dr=0.00. 




Deficit-reducing aid  
Horizon [years] 
Variable    0  1 2 3 4 5  15  Std  dev. 
Aid inflow [% GDP] 
a 2.000  1.000  0.500  0.250 0.125 0.063  0.001   
    4(a): Post-stabilization countries 
1: Pure float 
In  -10.465  -2.983 -2.206 -1.478 -0.956 -0.608  -0.005  11.269 
NER  -14.056  -1.737 -1.479 -0.951 -0.582 -0.352  -0.002  14.290 
RER  -6.529  -4.264 -2.941 -1.984 -1.303 -0.839  -0.006  8.733 
RIR  -0.396  -0.960 -0.709 -0.462 -0.291 -0.181  -0.001  1.390 
ca  0.759 0.031 -0.155 -0.174 -0.145 -0.107  -0.001  0.821 
DN  -1.591  -0.778 -0.559 -0.405 -0.281 -0.188  -0.002  1.937 
C  1.494  1.314 0.877 0.555 0.345 0.213  0.001  2.286 
dz  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 
mg  -7.749  -4.395 -3.191 -1.877 -1.065 -0.603  -0.003  9.733 
 
2: Crawl 
In  -0.016  -0.420 -0.518 -0.467 -0.379 -0.296  -0.098  1.596 
NER  -0.824  -0.518 -0.379 -0.275 -0.207 -0.165  -0.096  1.679 
RER  -1.471  -1.648 -1.394 -1.045 -0.734 -0.496  -0.014  2.984 
RIR  -1.121  -0.878 -0.605 -0.396 -0.251 -0.157  -0.001  1.629 
ca 1.098  0.322  0.029  -0.063  -0.078 -0.068  -0.004  1.154 
DN 0.670  0.202  0.000  -0.066  -0.074 -0.062  -0.001  0.713 
C  1.668  1.158 0.759 0.484 0.304 0.190  0.007  2.256 
dz  11.243  6.498 4.276 2.655 1.506 0.933  0.643  14.107 
mg -0.675  -1.210  -0.352 -0.061  0.013  0.011 -0.096  1.899 
 
3: Buffer + float 
In  -4.199  -2.128 -2.097 -1.791 -1.488 -1.242  -0.496  6.401 
NER  -5.993  -1.772 -1.790 -1.494 -1.244 -1.061  -0.492  7.347 
RER  -3.262  -2.616 -2.058 -1.518 -1.074 -0.746  -0.070  5.132 
RIR  -1.041  -1.072 -0.718 -0.449 -0.276 -0.169  -0.003  1.753 
ca  0.871 0.146 -0.080 -0.133 -0.125 -0.102  -0.014  0.920 
DN  0.047  -0.048 -0.189 -0.214 -0.186 -0.144  -0.016  0.413 
C  1.835  1.362 0.875 0.548 0.344 0.219  0.017  2.549 
dz  12.500  5.625 2.129 0.545  -0.263 -0.641  -7.760  14.265 
mg  -0.343  -2.145 -2.340 -1.919 -1.568 -1.321  -0.607  5.333 
 
    4(b): Post-stabilization countries 
1: Pure float 
In  -13.436  -6.132 -4.219 -2.776 -1.885 -1.207  -0.012  15.805 
NER  -17.218  -5.212 -3.442 -2.133 -1.441 -0.870  -0.005  18.533 
RER  -6.051  -4.579 -3.336 -2.307 -1.597 -1.059  -0.013  8.866 
RIR  -0.938  -0.767 -0.499 -0.390 -0.229 -0.185  -0.006  1.406 
ca  0.791 0.112 -0.121 -0.180 -0.163 -0.132  -0.003  0.864 
DN  -1.377  -1.087 -0.834 -0.577 -0.415 -0.269  -0.003  2.101 
C  1.511  1.084 0.736 0.509 0.332 0.228  0.004  2.111 
dz  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 
mg  -10.311  -8.547 -5.233 -2.957 -1.936 -1.061  0.003  14.874 
 
2: Crawl  
In  -0.047  -0.610 -0.647 -0.566 -0.462 -0.369  -0.133  2.264 
NER  -0.804  -0.771 -0.533 -0.386 -0.293 -0.234  -0.130  2.314 
RER  -1.212  -1.470 -1.289 -1.000 -0.729 -0.513  -0.017  2.709 
RIR  -0.967  -0.707 -0.498 -0.341 -0.230 -0.153  -0.002  1.376 
ca 1.220  0.404  0.070  -0.051  -0.081 -0.076  -0.005  1.297 
DN  0.613 0.165 -0.007 -0.061 -0.067 -0.057  -0.001  0.647 
C  1.453  1.013 0.692 0.465 0.310 0.206  0.008  2.002 
dz  9.650  8.768 5.480 3.432 2.145 1.333  -0.065  14.851 
mg -1.753  -1.182  -0.372 -0.069  0.017  0.018 -0.126  2.839 
Table 4 con’t 
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Table 4 (con’t) 
Deficit-reducing aid  
Horizon [years] 
Variable    0  1 2 3 4 5  15  Std  dev. 
Aid inflow [%GDP] 
a  2.000  1.000 0.500 0.250 0.125 0.063  0.001 
3: Buffer + float 
In  -6.446  -5.966 -3.404 -4.040 -2.182 -2.737  -0.927  11.795 
NER  -8.118  -6.401 -2.556 -4.094 -1.523 -2.811  -0.982  12.694 
RER    -2.675  -3.370 -2.013 -2.099 -1.045 -1.162  -0.136  5.519 
RIR   -2.237  -0.095  -1.222  0.194 -0.716  0.252  0.079  2.761 
ca    0.855  0.272  -0.095  -0.092 -0.171 -0.091  -0.010  0.943 
DN    0.401  -0.677  -0.140  -0.606 -0.094 -0.395  -0.059  1.135 
C  1.974  0.957 0.914 0.359 0.447 0.121  -0.003  2.467 
dz    12.500  5.625 2.219 0.545  -0.263 -0.641  -0.643  14.265 
mg    -1.206  -9.519 -1.819 -5.851 -0.744 -3.974  -1.250  13.246 
Notes: see Table 3. Except [4] dr=0.25. 
domestic financing requirement is fully insulated from the direct effects of the aid inflow, 
although some volatility in domestic financing may remain as a result of volatility in the 
budget induced by movements in prices, interest rates and the exchange rate. In Table 4 
public spending increases by less than the full amount of the aid inflow by assuming that 
public spending adjusts by (1 ) δ −   of the aid shock, and the remainder, () t aa δ − , is 
passed on to the monetary authorities in the form of a reduction in domestic credit growth, 
where  0.25 δ = . In Table 5 we broaden the range of instruments to introduce partial bond 
sterilization under which the authorities choose to sterilize a portion of the liquidity 
injection associated with aid-financed spending using bond sales and a portion using 
foreign exchange sales. Finally, in Table 6 we briefly examine the expenditure smoothing 
case, in which the fiscal extend the duration of public expenditure relative to that of the 
aid surge. 
Although relevant for some countries and episodes, we do not report in detail the results 
for the case in which an aid inflow produces a public spending increase but where the 
monetary authority, having initially accumulated the full amount of the aid inflow as 
reserves, neither runs these down nor attempts to sterilize the liquidity injection through 
bond sales. This case, which draws directly on the earlier literature on the use of 
counterpart funds arsing from the sale of commodity aid (for example Roemer 1989), and 
which we refer to as the counterpart fallacy, corresponds directly to a deficit-financed 
expansion in public expenditure.15 Not surprisingly in these circumstances, inflation 
immediately surges and the nominal exchange rate depreciates sharply, creating a sharp 
demand-switching boom in the nontraded goods sector which, in turn, generates a 
substantial temporary current account surplus as the private sector seeks to smooth the 
temporary increase in its disposable income. However, this outcome has nothing directly 
to do with aid: what has occurred is simply a large, temporary, money-financed increase 
in the fiscal deficit whose macroeconomic consequences are largely well understood.16 
                                                 
15 IMF (2005) refers to this as a case of ‘spend and don’t absorb’ although strictly this refers only to the 
public sector response to the aid inflow: the extent to which absorption changes in these circumstances 
depends on the evolution of the private capital account. 
16 Simulations for the counterpart fallacy case are available from the authors.  
15 
In each table we report the simulated impulse response functions (IRFs) of real and 
monetary variables in response to a positive shock to aid of 2 per cent of GDP, around its 
steady state mean value of 10 per cent. Given our focus on policy responses to well-
defined discrete events (i.e., positive aid surges) we emphasize the IRFs. However the 
final column of each table also reports the theoretical standard deviations of the 
endogenous variables given the specification of the stochastic process for aid. We limit 
the presentation of the results to a core set of variables as listed in Table 2b.17 
Table 5 
Mixed foreign exchange and bond sterilization 
(50:50) rule 
Horizon [years] 
Variable   0  1  2  3  4  5  15  Std dev. 
Aid inflow [% GDP] 
a 2.000  1.000  0.500  0.250 0.125 0.063  0.001   
   Post-stabilization  countries 
      1. All aid spent with [50:50] sterilization rule 
In 12.805  4.624  4.195  3.795 3.501 3.275  1.933 18.357 
NER 15.227  3.014  3.631  3.555 3.394 3.230  1.939 19.639 
RER  4.404 1.477 0.451  0.015  -0.179 -0.262  -0.209  4.792 
RIR -1.072  -0.058  0.014  -0.006 -0.021 -0.028  -0.021  1.080 
ca  1.978 0.962 0.389  0.100  -0.040 -0.105  -0.106  2.297 
DN  2.494 0.887 0.435  0.256 0.173 0.130  0.058  2.720 
C  0.831 0.344 0.317  0.324  0.321 0.311  0.189  1.461 
dz 25.000  11.250  4.438  1.091  -0.526 -1.281  -1.286  28.531 
db 11.111  5.000  1.972  0.485  -0.234 -0.569  -6.898  12.681 
mg  1.112 1.514 3.644  3.995 3.988 3.877  2.380 14.446 
 
Memo items 
Dint (% GDP)  -0.218  0.129  0.184 0.184  0.176  0.168  0.101 0.675 
Table 4a [Buffer plus float] 
RIR    -1.571 -1.296 -0.847  -0.528 -0.325 -0.199  -0.001  2.305 
Dint (% GDP)   0.117  -0.126  -0.124  -0.092 -0.064 -0.042  -0.000  0.246 
2. Partial deficit reduction with [50:50] sterilization rule 
In    -0.014 1.370 1.883  2.121 2.212 2.220  1.449  8.529 
NER    -0.809 1.443 2.036  2.255 2.313 2.292  1.454  8.740 
RER    -1.447 -1.313 -1.035  -0.791 -0.608 -0.477  -0.159  2.635 
RIR    -0.022 -0.031 -0.064  -0.070 -0.063 -0.053  -0.016  0.163 
ca  1.699 0.714 0.244  0.028  -0.067 -0.105  -0.079  1.906 
DN    -0.309 -0.261 -0.155  -0.075 -0.022  0.011  0.043  0.482 
C  0.387 0.377 0.363  0.334  0.302 0.274  0.142  1.118 
dz    18.750 8.438 3.328  0.818  -0.395 -0.961  -0.965  21.398 
db  8.333 3.750 1.480  0.363  -0.175 -0.428  -5.173  7.258 
mg   -6.859  -0.671  0.820  1.938 2.427 2.609  1.785 12.126 
 
Memo items 
Dint (% GDP)  -0.072  0.073  0.098 0.109  0.113  0.114  0.076 0.450 
Table 4a [Buffer plus float] 
RIR  -1.041 -1.072 -0.718  -0.449 -0.276 -0.169  -0.003  1.753 
Dint (% GDP)  0.161  -0.111  -0.112  -0.082 -0.056 -0.036  -0.000  0.251 
Notes:   See Table 3. 
 
                                                 
17 All the simulations presented here are generated by the Dynare-Matlab routines (Juillard 1996) using a 
first-order Taylor approximation to the nonlinear model around the nonstochastic steady state.  
16 
We contrast the behaviour of pre- and post-stabilization countries. In the interest of 
space, however, we limit the results to the case where we assume some price stickiness 
in nontradable price adjustments. With minor exceptions, mentioned as we present the 
results, the qualitative insights of our analysis are not radically altered if we assume that 
prices are fully flexible.18  
Table 6 
Fiscal smoothing in post-stabilization economies 
Horizon 
Variable  0 1  2 3 4  5    15  Std  dev 
Aid inflow [% GDP] 
a  2.000 1.000 0.500 0.250 0.125 0.063 0.001 
   Table 6(a): Aid fully spent [dr=0.0] 
   1. Float with fiscal smoothing [c.f. Table 3(a) panel 1] 
In  -2.527 2.190 1.715 0.971 0.442 0.141  -0.008 3.912 
NER  -4.604 3.004 2.105 1.171 0.586 0.264  -0.003 6.037 
RER  -3.776 -2.296 -1.588 -1.225 -0.963 -0.739 -0.013  5.061 
RIR  1.438  0.018 -0.575 -0.644 -0.529 -0.384 -0.003  1.833 
ca  1.390  0.207 -0.238 -0.335 -0.302 -0.233 -0.003  1.530 
DN  -1.098 0.030 0.334 0.284 0.168 0.076  -0.003 1.197 
C  0.634 1.287 1.296 1.034 0.742 0.501 0.004 2.405 
dz  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
s  1.000 1.000 0.750 0.500 0.312 0.187 0.000 1.721 
dW  25.000  0.000 -6.250 -6.250 -4.688 -3.125 -0.011  27.217 
 
   2. Crawl with fiscal smoothing [c.f. Table 3(a) panel 2] 
In    -0.574 0.225 0.249 0.115  -0.002 -0.067 -0.014  0.707 
NER    -1.666 0.192 0.398 0.299 0.177 0.091  -0.009 1.765 
RER    -1.986 -2.045 -1.773 -1.438 -1.112 -0.826 -0.013  3.990 
RIR    -0.107 -0.307 -0.497 -0.509 -0.427 -0.322 -0.004  0.995 
ca  1.235  0.252 -0.160 -0.276 -0.266 -0.214 -0.003  1.361 
DN  0.157 0.095 0.101 0.067 0.026 -0.004 -0.002  0.226 
C  1.284 1.235 1.096 0.870 0.638 0.444 0.005 2.427 
dz    22.717 -3.754 -6.378 -4.705 -2.810 -1.494  0.003  24.571 
s  1.000 1.000 0.750 0.500 0.312 0.187 0.000 1.721 
dW    25.000  0.000 -6.250 -6.250 -4.688 -3.125 -0.011  27.217 
 
 
   Table 6(b): Aid not fully spent, sticky prices with dr=0.25 
   1. Float with fiscal smoothing [c.f. Table 4(a) panel 1] 
In    -11.512  -0.456 0.023 0.003 -0.082 -0.131 -0.007  11.525 
NER  -15.682 1.436 0.891 0.467 0.207 0.067  -0.003  15.781 
RER    -7.581 -4.143 -2.565 -1.721 -1.196 -0.835 -0.012  9.323 
RIR    1.861  0.026 -0.505 -0.549 -0.444 -0.320 -0.003  2.098 
ca  1.258  0.148 -0.226 -0.299 -0.263 -0.201 -0.002  1.375 
DN    -3.003 -0.903 -0.231 -0.054 -0.025 -0.029 -0.002  3.145 
C  0.239 1.085 1.097 0.867 0.618 0.416 0.003 1.966 
dz  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
s  0.750 0.750 0.562 0.375 0.234 0.141 0.000 1.291 
dW    18.750 -0.000 -4.688 -4.688 -3.516 -2.344 -0.008  20.412 




                                                 
18 The full set of simulation results for the flex-price case is available on request from the authors.  
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Table 6 (con’t) 
Fiscal smoothing in post-stabilization economies 
Horizon 
Variable  0 1  2 3 4  5    15  Std  dev 
Aid inflow [% GDP] 
a  2.000 1.000 0.500 0.250 0.125 0.063 0.001 
   2. Crawl with fiscal smoothing [c.f. Table 4(a) panel 2] 
In    -1.263 -0.286 -0.098 -0.104 -0.140 -0.161 -0.087  1.730 
NER    -2.258  -0.269 0.061 0.067  0.015 -0.031 -0.084  2.520 
RER    -1.809 -1.779 -1.490 -1.178 -0.896 -0.659 -0.018  3.423 
RIR    -0.173 -0.239 -0.369 -0.379 -0.320 -0.242 -0.003  0.762 
ca  1.377  0.416 -0.009 -0.155 -0.176 -0.151 -0.005  1.474 
DN  0.021  -0.027 0.011 0.012  -0.002 -0.015 -0.002  0.058 
C  1.012 0.933 0.824 0.657 0.484 0.339 0.008 1.858 
dz    30.784  2.135 -2.476 -2.440 -1.603 -0.902 -0.068  31.128 
s  0.750 0.750 0.562 0.375 0.234 0.141 0.000 1.291 
dW    18.750  0.000 -4.688 -4.688 -3.516 -2.344 -0.008  20.412 
 
   3. Buffer + float with fiscal smoothing [c.f. Table 4(a) panel 3] 
In    -4.567 -1.585 -1.709 -1.606 -1.419 -1.219 -0.418  6.198 
NER    -6.344 -1.121 -1.479 -1.400 -1.225 -1.050 -0.413  7.318 
RER    -3.231 -2.387 -1.968 -1.592 -1.238 -0.930 -0.066  5.095 
RIR    0.076 -0.536 -0.571 -0.469 -0.348 -0.244 -0.004  1.033 
ca  1.180  0.234 -0.118 -0.215 -0.211 -0.174 -0.013  1.273 
DN    -0.446 -0.065 -0.077 -0.120 -0.135 -0.128 -0.015  0.539 
C  1.180 1.215 0.971 0.712 0.499 0.341 0.016 2.188 
dz    31.250  4.688 -3.359 -4.754 -4.126 -3.138 -0.545  32.797 
s  0.750 0.750 0.562 0.375 0.234 0.141 0.000 1.291 
dW    18.750  0.000 -4.688 -4.688 -3.516 -2.344 -0.008  20.412 
Notes:   See Table 3; [1] smoothing parameter = 0.50. 
3.1   All aid is spent 
When the fiscal authorities spend all the aid inflow as it is received, domestic financing 
is fully and continuously insulated (see Equation (1) above). Moreover, full spending 
implies there is no distinction between a pure float and a buffer plus float. Both, 
however, entail a different path for the nominal exchange rate and aggregate prices 
compared to the crawl, at least in the short run, even though macroeconomic outcomes 
are similar in the two cases and, most importantly, are largely benign. The only 
significant difference is how the initial real exchange rate appreciation associated with 
the aid inflow is effected: an initial inflationary spike is required under the crawl 
whereas under a float the initial adjustment is mildly deflationary as the nominal 
exchange rate appreciates. In neither case are the effects large. While the crawl delivers 
marginally less volatility for both inflation and the real exchange rate, and marginally 
more current account volatility, the differences between these polar approaches to 
exchange rate policy are second-order, particularly for the post-stabilization countries. 
When all aid is spent, little happens to the exchange rate in the float case: the required 
real appreciation is modest, and it is accomplished with relatively little volatility in the 
nominal exchange rate, while inflation falls slightly along the transition path. This 
follows directly from Equation (5) where, under a float,  0 t z Δ=. Assuming the 
authorities do not engage in bond operations, then if the fiscal authorities spend aid as it 
is received so that () () tt dd aa −=−, the right-hand side of (5), the fiscal authority’s  
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seigniorage requirements, will be zero on a continuing basis.19 At the same time, 
however, the demand for domestic money is increasing as a result of higher private 
incomes and the substitution of domestic for foreign currency balances as the nominal 
exchange rate appreciates. More surprisingly, perhaps, the same logic suggests that 
there will be relatively little to differentiate an aggressive crawl from a pure float. 
Because the bulk of the aid is sold—and absorbed—roughly as rapidly as it is spent, 
even a tight crawl therefore requires little net foreign exchange accumulation. These 
features carry over to the case of pre-stabilization countries although, as a result of the 
higher inflation elasticity of the demand for money, the IRFs and volatilities are 
magnified, and the differences between the monetary rules larger, compared to the post-
stabilization results.  
3.2  Aid not fully spent  
Matters are rather different when aid is not fully spent but is used to provide an element 
of fiscal stabilization. From Equations (1) or (3), we see that when () () tt dd aa −<− 
this generates a first-order decline in domestic financing requirements and confronts the 
monetary authorities with the explicit challenge of how to manage this alteration to the 
path of domestic financing. In this case the buffer plus float rule is no longer equivalent 
to a pure float. Although it is doubtful that any country pursues a pure float, in the strict 
sense that the aid inflow is met with absolutely no change in official reserves, it is 
important to understand the consequences of adopting such a rule, if only to shed light 
on why the buffer plus float delivers the outcomes it does. Hence we start with the pure 
float which is illustrated in panel 1 of Tables 4a and 4b respectively. By setting  0 z Δ=  
(and assuming for the moment that the authorities do not engage in bond sterilization) 
the pure float implies that the contraction in the fiscal deficit after net budgetary aid is 
fully met by a contraction in the government’s seigniorage requirement for a given 
stock of domestic debt. The consequences are dramatic, even for the post-stabilization 
countries: the nominal exchange rate appreciates by around 14 per cent on impact 
(compared to an appreciation of around 2.4 per cent in the corresponding no-deficit 
reduction case reported in Table 3), and the real rate appreciates by 6.5 per cent (again 
compared to 2.4 per cent). These powerful price effects induce a contraction in 
nontradable output of 1.6 per cent on impact compared to an increase of around 0.8 per 
cent in Table 3. What has happened here is that the reduction in expected inflation as a 
result of the fiscal adjustment shifts the private sector’s asset portfolio in favour of 
domestic money: given the contraction in the supply of money and the fact that the 
authorities are not intervening in the foreign exchange market, this requires the nominal 
exchange rate to overshoot in the short run to restore portfolio equilibrium. Since the 
nominal appreciation is much larger than the real appreciation required to absorb the aid 
inflow, nontradable prices must fall sharply. If, as we assume here, there is a measure of 
price stickiness, a sharp short-run recession in the nontradable goods sector ensues. 
                                                 
19   In the simulations reported here this is not strictly true because of other second-order influences on 
liquidity growth. In particular, the model assumes that government current expenditure is split 
between tradables (gT) and nontradables (gN). Measured in units of the numeraire good government 
expenditure is defined as g = gT + egN. In the simulation model used here, we assume that government 
expenditure is set in volume terms so that changes in the real exchange rate (e) alter the fiscal stance 
through revaluation of egN.; these have (second-order) consequences for the fiscal deficit and hence 
the growth of liquidity. Were we to assume that government expenditure is set in value terms, relative 
price movements would have no impact on liquidity growth.  
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Against this counterfactual, strategies that align absorption more closely to spending 
and hence smooth the path for seigniorage can substantially close off this source of 
macroeconomic volatility. Both the crawl (Panel 2) and a buffer plus float (Panel 3) do 
rather well in these circumstances. In both cases, but particularly under the crawl, the 
disruptive volatility in inflation and the real exchange rate are greatly reduced. The 
sharp deflationary impact under the pure float is substantially eliminated, with prices 
falling by 4 per cent under the buffer plus float and virtually not at all under the crawl, 
compared to a 10 per cent fall under the pure float. By the same token, the impact real 
exchange rate appreciation is pegged back to around 1.5 per cent under the crawl and 
3.3 per cent under the buffer plus float compared to 6.5 per cent under a pure float and 
Although the pattern of reserve accumulation is broadly similar under the crawl and 
buffer plus float, as indeed are the real outcomes, these two approaches are not the 
same. Moreover, the differences between them emerge much more forcefully in pre-
stabilization settings where, as Table 1 suggests, the fiscal authorities are more likely to 
direct a proportion of aid towards deficit reduction. As Table 4b shows the crawl 
contributes to a much smoother adjustment path in response to the aid surge than does 
the  buffer plus float. Here, the central bank’s tight crawl aligns movements in the 
nominal exchange rate much more closely to the modest real exchange rate adjustment 
required to absorb the aid inflow, while the (unsterilized) liquidity injection arising from 
reserve accumulation ensures that the latent contraction in the domestic money supply 
observed under the float is forestalled. Instead, the increased demand for liquidity as a 
result of the decline the seigniorage requirement is accommodated without requiring a 
sharp price adjustment so that the economy responds to the aid inflow with virtually 
stable prices. Domestic output is hardly affected and total private spending follows a 
smoother path. As with the post-stabilization case, this ‘crawl-with-no-bond-
sterilization’ strategy appears to deliver an extremely attractive response to a temporary 
aid inflow. 
The buffer plus float strategy goes some way to delivering this same outcome, although 
much less successfully in the pre-stabilization case compared to the post-stabilization 
calibration. The high nominal volatility seen in Panel 1 is still avoided, but the 
adjustment trajectory still entails more nominal and real exchange rate movement in the 
short run, a sharper decline in volatility and much stronger private capital inflows than 
are observed under a crawl. The reason is that the buffer plus float involves reserve 
accumulation with respect to the unspent portion of aid only—thereby stabilizing 
seigniorage (assuming no change in domestic borrowing)—but maintains a free float 
with respect to absorption of the spent portion of the aid and all other shocks. This rule, 
in effect, serves to efficiently match the supply of domestic liquidity but does not fully 
accommodate changes in the demand for domestic liquidity arising from the fall in 
expected inflation. By contrast, under a crawl, the central bank stands ready to exchange 
however much domestic for foreign currency is required at the prevailing (targeted) 
exchange rate: hence the higher official reserve accumulation. Given the higher 
elasticity of demand for money with respect to expected inflation in the pre-stabilization 
calibration, this difference in the degree of intervention is magnified and with it the 
difference in performance of the two strategies. Put simply, as the inflation elasticity of 
the demand for money rises, the buffer plus float does less well in aligning the demand 
and supply of domestic liquidity compared to the float.  
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3.3  Bond sterilization  
The crawl and buffer plus float policies in Tables 3 and 4 each end up allocating 100 per 
cent of the burden of liquidity control to foreign exchange sales. Macroeconomic 
adjustment is smooth, suggesting that there is no obvious case for shifting some of 
stabilization burden to bond operations. This impression is confirmed in Table 5 where 
we examine the case where the authorities are assumed to adopt the  ] 1 , [ γ γ −  rule 
described in section 2.2 under which domestic currency value of aid spending is 
matched in equal amounts by sales of foreign exchange and government securities. 
Compared with either the buffer plus float or the crawl, however, this rule does 
relatively poorly. When aid is fully spent, bond sterilization makes very little sense: it 
contributes to a steady depreciation in the nominal exchange rate and persistent 
domestic inflation. When aid is partly used for deficit reduction we already know that a 
pure float performs very poorly so that by comparison the relatively good performance 
under the mixed sterilization rule gives little comfort. This is not the correct 
comparison, however, and a closer look at the simulations suggests that the mixed 
sterilization rule is decisively dominated by the crawl and buffer plus float, and in one 
respect in particular. Compared with both, the path for the real interest rate under bond 
sterilization is substantially higher than under the relevant counterfactuals considered in 
Table 4. The reason is that the path of domestic deficit financing is affected by domestic 
interest costs arising from sterilization. With domestic debt a state variable in this 
system, domestic interest costs rise sharply relative to the no bond sterilization case 
beyond the first period and hence reverse the tendency for expected inflation to decline 
as would otherwise be the case (see the memo items to Table 5). This is not surprising 
since, as we have stressed above, the aid inflow is deflationary, especially if there is a 
deficit-reduction component, so that there is no intrinsic inflationary problem associated 
with the growth of liquidity; indeed, as the distinction between the crawl and the buffer 
plus float highlights, the problem may be the reverse. Ironically, therefore, a strategy 
such as that expressed by Brownbridge and Tumusiime-Mutebile at the start of this 
paper, which is built around a narrow focus on nominal liquidity growth, may prompt 
the authorities into using bond sterilization at exactly the time when a liquidity injection 
rather than a withdrawal is required. 
3.5  Smoothing public expenditure  
We close by briefly considering the case where the fiscal authorities operate an ‘aid 
account’ in order to stretch aid-funded public spending over a longer horizon than the 
aid shock, possibly in response to conventional smoothing considerations or to avoid 
placing excessive pressure on the absorptive capacity of the public sector. As before, we 
focus on the characteristics of monetary responses given the fiscal stance. For each 
reported simulation we also assume that the fiscal authorities apply the smoothing rule 
defined by (5) with  0.5 μ = , which approximately doubles the half-life of the 
expenditure response relative to that of the aid shock. In addition to the variables 
reported earlier, Table 6 also records the IRFs and volatility for the government 
discretionary expenditure (denoted s) and the change in the ‘aid account’ (dW). Again in 
the interest of space we limit our attention to the post-stabilization calibration only; the 
results for each panel are directly comparable to corresponding panels in Tables 3(a) 
and 4(a). Three key features emerge from Table 6. First, fiscal smoothing reduces the 
volatility of total spending, regardless of the monetary policy response; this is  
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unsurprising given that public spending in these simulations consists entirely of a 
transfer to the private sector. Second, however, although fiscal smoothing does not alter 
the total volume of spending out of aid—only its timing—the operation of the ‘aid 
account’ removes the previous insulation of domestic liquidity afforded by the pure 
float. Hence, although the aid shock is smoothed, inflation and exchange rate volatility 
is higher under a float than in the case where there is no fiscal smoothing. The reverse is 
true under the crawl where volatility is marginally reduced relative to the no fiscal-
smoothing case. This result is consistent with our earlier discussion of the distinction 
between the float and the crawl when domestic financing is not fully insulated, even 
though for the calibration considered here the differences are not substantial. Third, as is 
shown in Table 6(b) however, when some of the aid is used for deficit reduction, an 
aggressive crawl remains much the most effective way of minimizing macroeconomic 
volatility, even when the fiscal authorities act to smooth spending out of the aid inflow. 
In other words, the same argument applies: regardless of the fiscal motive for 
expenditure smoothing, monetary policy is at its most efficient when it serves to 
appropriately align the supply and demand for domestic liquidity. 
4  Conclusions and extensions  
We argued at the beginning of this paper that central bankers in Africa face substantial 
problems in managing aid surges. In practice, many central banks appear to have 
adopted strategies involving substantial intervention and reserve accumulation in 
response to aid surges, accompanied in many cases by fairly aggressive bond 
sterilization. The simulations presented in this paper suggest that this pattern of foreign 
exchange intervention is consistent with efficient monetary policy responses to 
substantial aid volatility, particularly in circumstances where countries continue to use 
part of the aid inflow for inflation stabilization purposes. The case for bond sterilization 
is less well grounded, however. 
Our simulations suggest that efficient monetary management of aid inflows centres on 
the extent to which it can successfully align the path of domestic deficit financing with 
the demand for domestic base money. This requirement reflects the central role we 
ascribe to private sector portfolio behaviour in such countries, and as such takes on 
particular important when fiscal decisions lead to sharp changes in seigniorage 
requirements. Thus when aid is fully spent as it is received, domestic financing needs 
are perturbed very little with the consequence that macroeconomic adjustment to a 
temporary aid surge is smooth and the choice of nominal anchor makes relatively little 
difference to the adjustment path; the aid surge facilitates higher private consumption 
and entails a modest appreciation of both the real and nominal exchange rate. If, 
however, aid is used partly to reduce the domestic financing requirement, consequent 
portfolio adjustment effects play a potentially important role in the macroeconomic 
dynamics. Realignment of absorption with spending in these circumstances, either 
through a crawl, in which the sales of aid dollars are endogenous to actual exchange rate 
movements, or a buffer plus float rule, which ties the reserve target to the fiscal 
absorption of aid, significantly reduces macroeconomic volatility. For ‘pre-stabilization’ 
settings where the inflation elasticity of the demand for money is likely to be higher, 
efficient responses to the fall in velocity associated with an aid-supported inflation 
stabilization appear to require greater intervention than provided by the buffer plus float.  
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In these circumstances the superiority of the crawl  in reducing nominal and real 
volatility on the adjustment path is decisive. 
Our simulations also demonstrate that, contrary to much popular thinking, aggressive 
bond sterilization does not have a central role to play in the efficient management of aid 
surges, at least in those circumstances where aid inflows do not trigger a generalized 
loss of fiscal control. There may, of course, be circumstances where fiscal control is less 
assured or where foreign exchange markets are perceived to be too shallow or otherwise 
distorted such as to limit the scope for intervention, in which case bond sterilization 
may constitute one component of a stabilization strategy. 
We close with three important caveats. First, the superiority of the crawl over the buffer 
plus float may need to be set against other considerations weighing in favour of 
exchange rate flexibility. For example, a buffer plus float may be better aligned with 
broader policy objectives aimed at supporting financial sector development or laying the 
foundations for a more explicit inflation targeting regime. Second, our analysis ascribes 
a central role to the private sector’s portfolio behaviour as a potential source of 
macroeconomic volatility. Clearly, if portfolio effects are weak, the distinction between 
alternative policy rules diminishes. However, as capital market integration increases, 
either formally or informally, portfolio effects of the kinds emphasized here are likely to 
increase rather than decreases in importance.  
Finally, we have abstracted entirely from issues of donor or government credibility, by 
assuming that the stochastic process for aid is common knowledge and that the 
government’s expenditure plans (as a function of aid) are known and fully credible. In 
reality, however, donors cannot commit to enhanced aid flows on an ongoing basis, and 
recipient governments, in turn, are unlikely to find it optimal to reduce spending point 
for point with unanticipated declines in aid. These realities suggest that a surge in aid, if 
it is aggressively spent at the outset, may create the expectation of fiscal destabilization 
even if both donor and recipient expect the aid to be highly persistent. In a related paper 
(Buffie et al. 2006), we examine how these private sector perceptions of fiscal stability 
may also shape the appropriate monetary response to aid. We argue that faced with 
credibility issues of this kind, a full ‘absorb and spend’ policy is potentially 
destabilizing since it provides no buffer against private-sector concerns about higher 
future seigniorage. By contrast, a strategy embodying some near-term fiscal restraint, 
combined with either a temporary accumulation of reserves or a temporary buyback of 
domestic debt, is a necessary component of a successful strategy until it becomes clear 
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